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  The Real North Korea

  The Real North Korea

  Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia

  ANDREI LANKOV

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  © 2013 Andrei Lankov

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  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Lankov, A. N. (Andrei Nikolaevich)

  The real North Korea : life and politics in the failed Stalinist utopia / Andrei Lankov.

  pages; cm.

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  ISBN 978-0-19-996429-1 (hardback : alk. paper)

  1. Korea (North)—Politics and government—1994–

  2. Korea (North)—Foreign relations. I. Title.

  DS935.774.L36 2013

  951.9304—dc23 2012046992

  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

  Printed in the United States of America

  on acid-free paper

  CONTENTS

  Acknowledgments

  Introduction

  Transcription

  CHAPTER 1 The Society Kim Il Sung Built and How He Did It

  Captain Kim Returns Home

  Way to War

  Between Moscow and Beijing: The Foreign Policy of Kim Il Sung’s North Korea

  Dealing with the South

  The Command Society

  A Country of Camps

  The World According to Kim Il Sung

  The Silver Lining in a Social Disaster

  The Birth of Juche, the Rise of the Son, and the Slow-Motion Demise of a Hyper-Stalinist Economy

  CHAPTER 2 Two Decades of Crisis

  And Then the World Changed

  Capitalism Reborn

  The State Withers Away

  Taking the Exit Option: Not an Exodus Yet, But …

  Arrival in Paradise, aka Capitalist Hell

  Changing Worldviews

  CHAPTER 3 The Logic of Survival (Domestically)

  Reform as Collective Political Suicide

  Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: (Not-So-Successful) Crackdowns on Market Activity

  A Disaster That Almost Happened: The Currency Reform of 2009

  The Belated Rise of a “New Star General”

  The Sudden Beginning of a New Era

  CHAPTER 4 Survival Diplomacy

  Playing the Nuclear Card

  Aid-Maximizing Diplomacy

  Meanwhile, in South Korea … (the Rise of 386ers and Its Consequences)

  A Decade of Sunshine

  The Sun Sets

  The Entry of China

  INTERLUDE The Contours of a Future: What Might Happen to North Korea in the Next Two Decades

  Why North Korea Is Likely to Continue for a While (But Not Forever)

  Contours of a Coming Crisis

  Stability Will Return, but How?

  CHAPTER 5 What to Do about the North?

  Why the Sticks Are Not Big Enough

  Why the Carrots Are Not Sweet Enough (and Why “Strategic Patience” Is Not a Great Idea, Either)

  Thinking Long Term

  The Hidden Benefits of Engagement

  Reaching the People

  Why They Matter: Working with the Refugees in South Korea

  CHAPTER 6 Being Ready for What We Wish For

  A Perfect Storm

  A Provisional Confederation as the Least Unacceptable Solution

  Something about Painkillers …

  Conclusion

  Notes

  Index

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  The present book would have been impossible without the support and encouragement of many individuals with whom I have discussed the numerous issues dealt with in the book. Among many others, I would like to mention Rüdiger Frank, Scott Snyder, John Park, Stephen Haggard, Nicolas Eberstadt, Marcus Noland, Fyodor Tertitsky, Tatiana Gabroussenko, Kim Yŏng-Il, Kim Sŏk-hyang, Yu Ho-yŏl, Nam Song-uk, Yu Kil-chae, Kim Byŏng-yŏn, and Zhu Feng.

  I am especially grateful to Peter Ward, who typed most of the manuscript while correcting my less than perfect English and also providing me with advice on both style and subject matter, as well as with valuable critiques of my ideas and arguments.

  When it deals with the issues of the recent social and economic developments, the book draws on the result of the research that was supported by a grant from the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2010-330-B00187). I also would like to express my deep gratitude to “Moravius” who allowed me to use some photos from his extensive collection.

  INTRODUCTION

  What does the average Westerner think when North Korea is mentioned? In all probability a number of oft-repeated phrases straight from the media will spring to mind. “A mad country,” “the world’s last Stalinist regime,” “nuclear brinkmanship,” and other similar clichés dominate popular understanding of North Korea. Above all, North Korea is said to be “irrational.” This is, allegedly, a country whose actions are unpredictable, defying common sense and perhaps even the laws of physics.

  But there is one problem with these clichés: they are largely wrong. North Korea is not irrational, and nothing shows this better than its continuing survival against all odds. North Korea is essentially a political living fossil, a relic of an era long gone. Similar regimes either changed out of recognition or disappeared long ago and are now remembered with disdain, if at all. Meanwhile, the regime in Pyongyang still remains in full control of its country. This is a remarkable feat, especially if we take into consideration that it has to operate in a highly—and increasingly—unfavorable environment.

  North Korea is a small country with few resources and a moribund economy. In spite of all this, however, it has managed to survive and successfully manipulate larger players, including an impressive number of the great powers. You simply cannot achieve this by being irrational. North Korea’s alleged penchant for irrational and erratic behavior is illusionary: the North Korean leaders actually know perfectly well what they are doing. They are neither madmen nor ideological zealots, but rather remarkably efficient and cold-minded calculators, perhaps the best practitioners of Machiavellian politics that can be found in the modern world.

  And what of other descriptions: Is North Korea really “driven by an insane ideological zeal”? Is it “unpredictably aggressive”? Indeed, the grotesquely bellicose and often nonsensical rhetoric of the North Korean official media and the country’s occasional armed provocations and nuclear weapons program might seem like
a confirmation of its alleged aggressiveness. However, a deeper look into Pyongyang’s decision making should make us skeptical of such claims. Pyongyang’s brinkmanship indeed appears risky at times, but so far North Korea’s leaders have known where to stop, how not to cross the red line, and how not to provoke an escalation of tensions into a full-scale war. They have employed saber rattling for decades as part of a shrewd (and highly rational) manipulative strategy that has succeeded—in most cases, at least.

  This book is, first of all, about the inner logic of North Korean behavior. This logic is defined by the peculiarities of North Korean society, which in turn are the results of long-term developments. I have written this book in order to explain how North Korea has come to be an international problem, and I also attempt to explain why North Korea’s leadership has had no option but to try to remain a pariah.

  The book starts with a sketch of North Korean history, which is important since familiarity with the history of the North is vital for anybody who wants to understand the current predicament facing the North Korean leadership. The Kim family regime began as a bold experiment in social engineering. This experiment was led by the elite, whose efforts were much encouraged—and often directly controlled—by Stalin’s Russia, but they also enjoyed considerable support from below.

  However, the initial rosy expectations and popular enthusiasm were sadly misplaced and soon North Korean society found itself saddled with an increasingly inefficient and unsustainable economic model that had become dependent on the constant infusion of foreign aid. Matters were made worse by the nature of the North Korean elite, which had become hereditary and almost impossible to challenge or change. As time passed and with no apparent way out of the predicament, the economic and political position of North Korea changed from acceptable to difficult before becoming disastrous.

  Sadly and strangely, the major problems faced by North Korea’s decision makers were created by the staggering economic success of North Korea’s twin state—the Republic of Korea. Even though it was impossible to know in 1945, South Korea chose a path that, at the end of the day, proved to be far more efficient and promising than the choices made by (or partially forced on) North Korea’s decision makers. However, the existence of the highly successful South Korean state has created continuous and nearly insurmountable problems for the North Korean elite.

  Thus, when things moved from bad to worse around 1990 after Soviet aid suddenly dried up, the North Korean elite and the Kim family decided that they should avoid reform, keep the situation under control as best as possible, and use diplomacy (backed, when necessary, by a bit of nuclear blackmail) to extract foreign aid, which remained vital for the survival of their economy. This decision led to a massive famine, not to mention countless deaths in prison camps, but it has worked so far: unlike other Communist regimes, the North Korean state has survived against seemingly impossible odds.

  As we shall see, the North Korean elite are neither zealous ideologues nor irrational sadistic killers—even though they occasionally look like (and indeed want to look like) both of these. As a matter of fact, some of these people might be quite nice human beings who, from time to time, feel sorry about the suffering that their policies have inflicted upon their people. But given the present situation, they simply do not see how else they can stay in control and protect not only their property (quite meager by current international standards) but, more importantly, their freedom to act and their lives (as well as the freedom and lives of their loved ones). Their approach is often described as paranoid, but I will argue that there may be no alternative to the current North Korean policies if judged from the prospects of the regime’s survival, which is the supreme goal of North Korean policy makers. Their current survival strategy might inflict considerable suffering on ordinary people, make genuine economic growth impossible, and generate significant international security risks. However, this strategy also ensures that a small hereditary elite keeps enjoying power and (moderate) luxury. And, sadly, there is no alternative that would be acceptable to the decision makers.

  It has often been suggested that Chinese-style, market-oriented reforms are the solution to the North Korean problem. Some people believe that North Korean decision makers can be lured or blackmailed into starting reforms, while others hope that they will finally come to their senses and do the right thing for their people as long as the outside world stops meddling in their affairs. However, as we shall see, there is a sound logic behind the stubborn unwillingness among the North’s decision makers to follow the Chinese way. Their fears might be exaggerated, to be sure, but they are by no means unfounded.

  This book might appear to be quite pessimistic. Even though I argue that there are ways to mitigate the problems and control the damage, it seems that there are no silver bullets or magic potions that can solve the North Korean problem instantly, easily, and painlessly.

  Just as the book was going to print a new leadership has begun to emerge in North Korea. As one might expect, the emergence of this new leadership has been accompanied by expectations and hopes for a better future for North Korea. As we will see, however, the country’s past gives little ground for optimism, but it is not impossible that the plump and jolly-looking young new Kim may well seek to break with the past and reform the country. He is still surrounded by the advisers and senior lieutenants of his father, but he might not agree with the logic of their survival strategy. There is a distinct possibility that he will attempt to improve the situation. Such attempts might even succeed, but it is also possible that the old guard is right, and that tampering with the system will aggravate the situation and lead to an uncontrollable implosion of the regime—a nightmarish scenario for North Korea’s many neighbors.

  At any rate, we might be on the brink of some serious changes, and even a transformation in North Korea. Taking into account the earlier experiences and sad present of this country, one should not expect a miracle. On the contrary, if past precedent is anything to go by, changes are likely to be painful and dangerous, even if they remain preferable to the current sorry state of affairs.

  Indeed, it might be that the worst is still yet to come—both for the North Koreans and outsiders. Hungarians are known to say: “What is worse than Communism? The things which come after it.” It is not impossible that one day, North Koreans will recycle this joke, saying, “What is worse than the Kim family regime? The things that come after it.” We do not know the final outcome, but it seems that the eventual transformation of North Korea is not going to be easy or unproblematic. I discuss some potential scenarios at the end of the book, and readers will see that some of these solutions might be more palatable than others. However, all are less than perfect.

  The North Korean regime might be annoying and occasionally dangerous for the outside world—largely thanks to its nuclear brinkmanship and proliferation threats—but its major victims are the North Koreans themselves, the vast majority of some 24 million people who inhabit this unlucky country. They are the primary victims of the regime, but also victims of history. North Korean rulers do what they are doing not because they are “evil” or driven by some delusionary ideologies, but rather because they sincerely believe that their current policy has no alternatives, and that any other policy choice will bring ruin to them and their families. Unfortunately, their assumption and worries might be well founded, so the concerns of the “top ten thousand people” (as well as a million or two of their henchmen, big and small) are understandable. Nonetheless, it does not bring any relief to the vast majority of the North Korean population whose lives have been—and continue to be—ruined by the regime.

  TRANSCRIPTION

  The transcription of Korean personal names has always been a challenge. The book generally follows the McCune-Reischauer system, but in the case of people whose names are frequently spelled differently in the mass media, the established spelling is used instead (this being the case with Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Nam, and other memb
ers of North Korea’s top leadership).

  CHAPTER 1

  The Society Kim Il Sung Built and How He Did It

  One cannot understand modern North Korea without having a look at its past. North Korea never experienced “reform,” that is, a government-initiated and government-controlled chain of systematic changes. But this by no means implies that North Korea has not changed. The North Korea of Kim Jong Il’s era was dramatically different from the North Korea of the 1953–1994 period. Nonetheless, what happened under Kim Il Sung has determined many of the features of modern North Korean society.

  The North Korea of the Kim Il Sung era was a very peculiar place indeed—arguably, one of the most idiosyncratic places in the entire world. It was established as a Soviet client state but with a great deal of support, enthusiasm, and hope. Soon, it evolved into the archetypal National Stalinist regime, and in this form it managed to survive all outside challenges and exist without much change until the early 1990s. It was a time when the Kim family regime grew and matured, and it was also a time when it learned how to survive and manipulate an utterly hostile environment.

  CAPTAIN KIM RETURNS HOME

  On some autumn September day of 1945 (the exact date is still in dispute, but it seems to be the 19th of September) a group of Asian-looking men, all clad in Soviet military uniform, disembarked from the Soviet steamer Pugachev at the Korean port city of Wonsan, then recently taken over by the Soviet forces. Among the arrivals there was a slightly stout man in his early 30s, with the insignia of a Soviet Army captain. To his comrades he was known as Kim Il Sung, commander of the 1st (Korean) battalion of the 88th independent brigade of the Soviet Army.

  This young Soviet captain was soon to become the supreme leader of the emerging North Korean state, but in 1945 he came back home after almost two decades spent overseas. In the 1930s Kim Il Sung was a guerrilla field commander in Northeastern China, and in the early 1940s he became a battalion commander in the 88th Brigade of the Soviet Army. Nonetheless, he was a native of the city of Pyongyang, which in late August became the headquarters of the Soviet forces in Korea.1